The noble (and despise) art of patching
Security failures rarely come from sophisticated magic. Most of the time they come from something painfully ordinary: a known vulnerability that stayed unpatched long after a fix existed. The technical details change every year, but the organizational pattern stays the same. Teams treat patching like maintenance work that can be postponed, while attackers treat unpatched systems like inventory. CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog exists for a reason. It is a public signal that certain flaws are being actively used in the wild, which means the question is not whether you will be targeted, it is when an automated scan will find you. If you run anything on the internet, you are in the same market as everyone else, and you do not get to opt out of opportunistic exploitation. The tricky part is that patching does not feel like progress. Shipping features feels like progress. Fixing what already exists feels like admitting something was wrong. That emotional frami...